In the Middle East and Africa, online space is often incorporated into power struggles and associated media manipulation efforts. Yet EMAs also remain crucial for secure communication among activists in both Ethiopia and Libya in particular - two countries that benefit from the increased privacy of EMAs.Key actors in all three countries use encrypted messaging apps (EMAs) as a medium for propaganda - combining them with the utilization of traditional social media, targeted internet shutdowns, and the mobilization of social media influencers and diaspora.Therefore, the Center for Media Engagement examined: How are encrypted messaging apps (EMAs) relevant for propagandists and/or activists in Egypt, Ethiopia, and Libya? How do these platforms fit into the existing (dis-)information landscape?
This is relevant since we recognize that propagandists are adaptive and rarely hold back from capitalizing on emerging technologies - and countries experiencing political transformations are more volatile to the effects of propaganda. Our understandings still lag behind in comprehending which platforms are most important for which political communication in those environments. In non-Western countries, however, it is often authoritarian state actors who are most prolific in spreading propaganda, including disinformation, due to their access to state resources and their desire to dominate the information landscape. In Western contexts, the dichotomy is seen as extremist actors exploiting social media platforms, such as Telegram, on one hand and other societal or state actors largely using these platforms for beneficial, benign purposes on the other. Read the executive summary in Arabic ( عربي) here and in Amharic ( አማርኛ) here.īy 2022, the exploitation of social media platforms by malevolent actors has been documented extensively.
0 kommentar(er)
